What BEC looks like
Business email compromise covers any scheme where email (or a lookalike domain) is used to redirect a business payment. It may be a spoofed “CEO” asking payroll to buy gift cards, a vendor “updating banking details,” or a quiet takeover of your bookkeeper’s real inbox with new forwarding rules.
Common variants
1. CEO / executive fraud
“I’m in a meeting — send a wire today, keep it confidential.” The display name looks right; the address is slightly off, or it is a free webmail account.
2. Vendor bank-change
A long-time supplier emails new ACH instructions attached as a PDF. Without a callback on a known number, AP updates the file and pays the attacker. Deep dive: vendor & invoice fraud.
3. Mailbox takeover
After phishing or password reuse, attackers sit in a real thread, then insert fraudulent payment instructions mid-conversation.
4. Attorney / closing impersonation
Especially around real estate and legal settlements — “updated escrow wiring instructions.”
How a wire gets stolen
- 1
Recon. Public org charts, LinkedIn, invoice formats, and who approves payments.
- 2
Access or spoof. Phish a mailbox or register a lookalike domain.
- 3
Urgency + secrecy. Deadline, audit, acquisition, or “don’t call me.”
- 4
Payment diversion. New bank details, crypto, or gift cards.
- 5
Rapid cash-out. Funds move through mule accounts within hours.
⚠️ Key warning
Never change payment details or send a new payee wire based only on email. Call a number already on file — not the number in the message.
Red flags
- Last-minute change to bank, routing, or beneficiary name
- Pressure to skip normal approval or keep the request secret
- Slight domain misspellings (
company-mail.com vs company.com)
- “Send from my personal Gmail / iCloud — corporate is down”
- Unusual gift-card or crypto payment requests from leadership
- Reply-all threads where only one person suddenly changes payment terms
Controls that work
- MFA on every mailbox — see 2FA / MFA.
- Dual control: two people to release wires/ACH above a threshold.
- Out-of-band verify: known phone callback for any payee change.
- DMARC / SPF / DKIM on your domains to make spoofing harder.
- Disable legacy basic auth; review forwarding rules weekly.
- Train AP and executive assistants with real BEC examples — see employee awareness.
- Paste suspicious payment emails into ScanBeyond before acting.
If you already sent money
- Call your bank’s fraud / wire recall desk immediately — minutes matter.
- Preserve the email headers, attachments, and approval trail.
- File an IC3 report and local police report; notify your cyber insurer.
- Reset email passwords/MFA; hunt for forwarding rules and mailbox rules.
- Warn vendors/customers if their threads were used as cover.
Suspicious “send the wire” email?
Analyze it before anyone at your company transfers funds.
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FAQ
Can banks always recall a wire?
Not reliably. Speed helps, but many BEC wires are gone. Prevention and dual control matter more than hope of recovery.
We recognized the person’s writing style. Is that proof?
No. Attackers copy prior emails from a compromised mailbox or public writing samples.